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This study examines the efforts of the US Air Force during 1958-1964 to develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems. These years were characterized by rapid, extensive change in the technology of nuclear weapons delivery systems, centering in ICBMs replacing bombers as the chief vehicles. Simultaneously, national military strategy changed with the transfer of power from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administrations, shifting from reliance on overwhelming nuclear retaliation to emphasis on balanced conventional and nuclear forces. Against this background, the study poses the question: did the Air Force, when confronted with major changes in technology and national policy, develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems that was politically acceptable, technically feasible, and strategically sound. Using the development of the Minuteman ICBM as a case study, the study examines the evolution of Air Force doctrine and concludes that the Air Force did not, because of conceptual problems and bureaucratic exigencies, develop a doctrine adequate to the requirements of deterrence in the dawning era of solid-fuel ICBMs.
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