First use of nuclear weapons: the constitutional role of a Congressional leadership committee
Although the War Powers Act brought some constitutional order to the question of respective prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches of government, the Act is flawed in the matter of first use of nuclear weapons. The author reviews the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadna that the legislative veto was unconstitutional as it relates to the committee approval mechanism involved in the first-use proposal. He finds that neither the case nor the Constitution precludes the first-use proposal, then argues for the committee approval mechanism on the grounds that such an important decision should be shared. The urgency to fire nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack is not present in a first-use scenario since conventional weapons would already be engaged. The Committee mechanism would involve Congress without jeopardizing speed and secrecy.
- Research Organization:
- Syracuse Univ., NY
- OSTI ID:
- 5642129
- Journal Information:
- J. Legis.; (United States), Vol. 13:1
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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