Safeguards implementation practices for a model mixed oxide recycle fuel fabrication facility
Conclusions on the magnitude of the inspection effort and its effectiveness in meeting IAEA objectives are summarized: the minimum goal quantity that can be detected with 95 percent probability is 6 kg Pu. eight to nine resident inspectors are necessary to monitor all operations (3 shifts a day) and to perform verification measurements (23 per day). The facility must also perform inventories monthly if the goal of 6.0 kg is to be attained. Bi-monthly inventory and continual on-site resident inspection can achieve a detection goal quantity of 8.0 kg Pu with 95 percent detection probability. For annual inventories, the detection goal quantity for a 95 percent detection probability is 40 kg Pu. The probability for detecting 8 kg is less than 20 percent. The total inspection effort for a 200 MT/year RFP is estimated to exceed 15 man-years if IAEA headquarters support and analytical laboratory time are added to on-site manpower requirements. Surveillance and containment in the form of seals must be applied to prevent double inventorying and to assure that samples are extracted from the vessel or container being measured. These assurances will probably be achieved by on-line instrumentation installed by the IAEA prior to plant start-up. For assessment, detailed knowledge of plant equipment and floor layout including piping used to transport material is needed. Such information should be requested from the facility prior to preparation of the SIP. Present NDA appears capable of measuring all material in the RFP; however, verification of residual hold-up will require development of new procedures. In-process inventory verification will require special procedures but can be accomplished with present technology. Alternatives to accountability such as perimeter surveillance and containment of declared material within the perimeter should be studied in order to improve detection sensitivity or decrease the effort. (DLC)
- Research Organization:
- Science Applications, Inc., La Jolla, Calif. (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- E(30-1)-16
- OSTI ID:
- 7344126
- Report Number(s):
- BNL-21409; TRN: 76-019853
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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