Safety analysis, risk assessment, and risk acceptance criteria
- Dept. of Energy, Germantown, MD (United States). Core Technical Support and Facility Transition
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
This paper discusses a number of topics that relate safety analysis as documented in the Department of Energy (DOE) safety analysis reports (SARs), probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) as characterized primarily in the context of the techniques that have assumed some level of formality in commercial nuclear power plant applications, and risk acceptance criteria as an outgrowth of PRA applications. DOE SARs of interest are those that are prepared for DOE facilities under DOE Order 5480.23 and the implementing guidance in DOE STD-3009-94. It must be noted that the primary area of application for DOE STD-3009 is existing DOE facilities and that certain modifications of the STD-3009 approach are necessary in SARs for new facilities. Moreover, it is the hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis (AA) portions of these SARs that are relevant to the present discussions. Although PRAs can be qualitative in nature, PRA as used in this paper refers more generally to all quantitative risk assessments and their underlying methods. HA as used in this paper refers more generally to all qualitative risk assessments and their underlying methods that have been in use in hazardous facilities other than nuclear power plants. This discussion includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods. PRA has been used, improved, developed, and refined since the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was published in 1975 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Much debate has ensued since WASH-1400 on exactly what the role of PRA should be in plant design, reactor licensing, `ensuring` plant and process safety, and a large number of other decisions that must be made for potentially hazardous activities. Of particular interest in this area is whether the risks quantified using PRA should be compared with numerical risk acceptance criteria (RACs) to determine whether a facility is `safe.` Use of RACs requires quantitative estimates of consequence frequency and magnitude.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 519105
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-97-1529; CONF-970661-12; ON: DE97007370; TRN: 97:016608
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 1997 safety analysis workshop, Oakland, CA (United States), 9-13 Jun 1997; Other Information: PBD: 1997
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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