Generalized Stackelberg feedback solutions for two-stage continuous kernel games
We consider a multi-act feedback Stackelberg game in which two players solve a Stackelberg problem at each stage, and each player knows the state of the game at every level of play. In this kind of game, the leader does not have the ability to announce his strategy at all levels of play prior to the start of the game, but he can enforce his strategy on the follower at every level of the game. Existence results for constrained problems will be given in the following two cases: the first one, already considered by Basar and Olsder, in which at each level i of play there exists a unique Stackelberg solution to the i-th problem, and the second one in which this assumption is removed. In the last case a concept of generalized Stackelberg feed-back solution is introduced taking into account that one of the single act Stackelberg game to solve at any level of play admits multiple equilibria.
- OSTI ID:
- 36303
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-9408161-; TRN: 94:009753-0637
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 15. international symposium on mathematical programming, Ann Arbor, MI (United States), 15-19 Aug 1994; Other Information: PBD: 1994; Related Information: Is Part Of Mathematical programming: State of the art 1994; Birge, J.R.; Murty, K.G. [eds.]; PB: 312 p.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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