Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancement Activities in Canada
- McMaster University (Canada)
In the immediate aftermath of the common-cause seismic and tsunami events that triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, the nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), requested that all Cass I nuclear facilities re-examine the safety cases for their nuclear facilities. Lessons-learned task forces were established by the CNSC, and the nuclear utilities, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Bruce Power (BP), and New Brunswick Power (NBP). The purposes of these independent task forces was to develop relevant lessons learned issues for the Candu nuclear power plants operating in Canada and to identify actions that could enhance safety. Subsequently, a CNSC Integrated Action Plan was developed to address the recommendations arising from the CNSC Task Force Report, and the licensees aligned their actions with this plan. The actions were grouped into four categories, as follows. 1. Strengthening defence in depth; Actions included re-assessment of a site-specific external hazards using PSA; physical plant changes to add further cooling water make-up capability to heat sinks; development of new Canadian standards and updated regulatory documents that address requirements for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA), Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Period Safety Review (PSR); development of a new and novel methodology for assessing multi-unit risk that is consistent with the IAEA construct of defence-in-depth (including a safety goal hierarchy and complementary risk analysis methods that address 'Black Swan' events); enhanced management of hydrogen combustion challenges; and enhanced Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). 2. Enhancing emergency response; Actions included provision of Emergency Mitigation Equipment (EME) such as transportable diesel-driven pumps or fire engines, transportable diesel generators for AC and instrument power; pre-installed connections to in-plant equipment via easily accessible and protected quick-connect points for water and electrical power; upgraded emergency response centres; enhanced communication systems and protocols; and enhanced emergency response programs, training and exercises. 3. Improving the regulatory framework and processes; 4. Enhancing international collaboration. Actions assigned under categories 3 and 4 were placed upon the regulator. This presentation will focus on the assigned actions in categories 1 and 2. The underlying motivation, objectives, and safety benefits associated with the actions will be described within the context of broader aspects of severe accident mitigation in water-cooled reactors. (author)
- Research Organization:
- American Nuclear Society - ANS, Thermal Hydraulics Division, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 22977485
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: ATH 16: International Topical Meeting on Advances in Thermal Hydraulics, New Orleans, LA (United States), 12-16 Jun 2016; Other Information: Country of input: France; available on CD Rom from American Nuclear Society - ANS, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
CANDU TYPE REACTORS
COMBUSTION
COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
HYDROGEN
NEW BRUNSWICK
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
ONTARIO
PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION
RADIATION PROTECTION
REACTOR ACCIDENTS
RECOMMENDATIONS
SAFETY ANALYSIS
SAFETY REPORTS
SAFETY STANDARDS
SEVERE ACCIDENTS
WATER COOLED REACTORS