NGSI: IAEA Verification of UF6 Cylinders
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often ignorant of the location of declared, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders following verification, because cylinders are not typically tracked onsite or off. This paper will assess various methods the IAEA uses to verify cylinder gross defects, and how the task could be ameliorated through the use of improved identification and monitoring. The assessment will be restricted to current verification methods together with one that has been applied on a trial basis—short-notice random inspections coupled with mailbox declarations. This paper is part of the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) program to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies and tracks UF6 cylinders.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1092029
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-88399; NN4009010
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 53rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 2012 (INMM 53), July 15-19, 2012, Orlando, Florida, 5:3232-3238
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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