The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis
This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed? Second, how compliance by adverse can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and to national comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections? Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that weak enforcement mechanism that the treaty will have such a although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the ``balance of terror.`` The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 10170556
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-LR-110659; ON: DE92019606
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: DN: Thesis submitted by J.E. Stern to Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; TH: Thesis (Ph.D.); PBD: May 1992
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
ARMS CONTROL
VERIFICATION
RECOMMENDATIONS
TREATIES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PLANNING
STABILITY
NATIONAL SECURITY
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
TERRORISM
350300
450600
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL