

planning session focused on the Department's mission, core values, and future trends. At the August Motorola session, Department officials developed a framework for producing a departmental strategic plan. In addition, participants reached a consensus on new directions and priorities for the Department. Suitably armed, the Department's executives returned from Motorola to spread the quality gospel and begin the strategic planning process. Videotapes of the Motorola training sessions were shown. Monthly articles on quality management appeared in *DOE This Month*, the Department's Newsletter. The Department distributed to all employees a booklet setting forth the Department's "Mission" and detailing the Department's "Core Values." The strategic planning process, headed by Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning, and Program Evaluation Susan Tierney, sought to include input from headquarters and field officials and employees, the national laboratories, and external stakeholders. Strategic planning and quality management training sessions were held for mid-level managers. These gave birth to similar sessions designed to inform, and receive input from, employees.<sup>286</sup>

## THE NEW CULTURE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

The thrust of Secretary O'Leary's new initiative was the creation of a "new culture" within the Department of Energy. With its emphasis on "inclusiveness, communication, and openness," this new culture stood in stark contrast to the insularity and secretiveness of the "old culture" descended from the Atomic Energy Commission. More than this, the old culture was a weapons culture. From the Manhattan Project to the Department of Energy, the development and production of nuclear weapons had been the dominant agency mission. Even Admiral Watkins, with his well-publicized campaign to reform the old culture, was at the same time part of that culture. He had been chosen secretary because of his military and nuclear power background. His mandate had been to resume the full-scale production of nuclear weapons. And for all

his reformist rhetoric, Watkins emphasized a command and control approach to managing the Department. O'Leary truly was different in this respect. Coming out of the energy side of the two departmental traditions, she had little background in defense and nuclear weapons matters. And the mandate she received from President Clinton, with his demand for "a different direction and a different policy," was clearly something new for the Department.

If any doubts existed that O'Leary was genuinely the Department's first post-Cold War secretary, they were soon dispelled by her approach to nuclear weapons testing. In fall 1992, Congress, despite President Bush's vigorous opposition, imposed as part of the energy and water appropriation a nine-month moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. Following the moratorium, Congress allowed for as many as fifteen nuclear tests through 1996. Imminent expiration of the moratorium forced the incoming Clinton Administration to consider resuming testing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense and State Departments initially favored conducting fifteen large shots. Opposition subsequently pared the proposal to only nine tests directed toward safety improvement and stockpile reliability. The "crucial turning point" on the testing issue, according to the *Washington Post*, came at a May 14 meeting of the National Security Council when O'Leary, instead of wholeheartedly endorsing the proposal, "startled" the group by urging further study. "I have never," one official present noted, "felt more frigid air in the room at an NSC meeting."<sup>287</sup>

No secretary of energy had ever come out against nuclear testing, and O'Leary certainly was not speaking for a united Department. The directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories argued the clear and present need for testing for safety and reliability purposes. The secretary's doubts were buoyed, however, at a seminar she convened on May 18 and 19. Against strong objections from the lab directors, physicist Frank Von Hippel and former Secretary of Energy and of Defense James Schlesinger argued that proposed safety tests would bring little benefit and there was no reason for warhead reliability tests when there