

project, O'Leary informed the House that the Department tentatively estimated that the project would cost less than \$11 billion. If the super collider cost more than \$11 billion, she promised, the Department would "present options" to Congress ranging from more funds to killing the project.<sup>276</sup>

The super collider, in addition, ran afoul of the applied *versus* basic research debate. Critics claimed that the project was too expensive and benefited too small a segment of society—namely, high energy physicists—at a time when the Nation faced economic hardships. One opponent termed the super collider a "pork barrel project of unparalleled dimensions, a wacky science project run amok, a black hole for greenbacks, and a full employment program for university physicists." Such attacks left the administration grasping, almost by the logic of its own rhetoric, for some sort of practical application for the super collider. President Clinton declared that technologies developed for the super collider's magnets would "stimulate production of a material that will be critical for ensuring the competitiveness of United States manufacturers, for improving medical care and a variety of other purposes," adding that the project would produce "critical employment and educational opportunities for thousands of young engineers and scientists around the country." In a similar vein, O'Leary contended that the super collider would provide not only "the answers to the origins of the universe" but also "great science in [the] medical treatment of cancer." More realistic was Burton Richter, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), who, when asked if there would be practical benefits from the super collider, replied "probably not, maybe yes."<sup>277</sup>

Ultimately, the burden carried by the super collider proved too much. On September 30, the Senate voted 57 to 42 for funding the super collider. House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) declined to name any super collider opponents to the ensuing conference committee, and, as a result, House and Senate negotiators agreed to fund the super collider. But on October 19 the House voted 283 to 143 to return the funding bill to the conference committee with instructions to kill the

project. With no hope of seriously narrowing the large margin of opposition, super collider proponents admitted defeat. "I think the last rites have been said, the coffin has been nailed shut and we're waiting for the funeral," observed Representative Jim Chapman (D-TX), a leader in the effort to save the super collider. The Department formally terminated the project following President Clinton's signing on October 28 of the appropriations bill ordering that the super collider be killed.<sup>278</sup>

The demise of the super collider produced consternation, within both the high energy physics community and the Department. Leon Lederman, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist who first proposed the super collider, stated "It's disheartening that a large number of fairly intelligent people could do such a dumb thing." O'Leary called the congressional decision "a devastating blow to basic research and to the technological and economic benefits that always flow from that research." The House, she noted, made the decision on the basis of reducing the federal deficit but the outcome would be "the loss of an important, long-term investment for the Nation in fundamental science." Looking ahead constructively was SLAC's Richter. "The message from Congress," he observed, "is that very large projects of this scale that are done for pure science are going to have to be done internationally. In the future, we're going to have to figure out how to do these things jointly with other regions of the world."<sup>279</sup>

## REINVENTING GOVERNMENT

If the termination of the super collider implied the need for new *modi operandi*, both the Clinton Administration and the Department of Energy zealously embraced changing the way government works. On March 3, 1993, President Clinton announced that Vice President Gore would head a team of mostly federal employees to conduct a six-month review of the Federal Government. According to the President, the goal of the National Performance Review, as it was termed, was "to make the entire federal government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change